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Abstract 
The key role of transport infrastructure in the emerging Euro-
pean network has provoked many questions as to the financing of new infrastruc-
ture. In the course of the twentieth century govemments in all countries have 
assumed responsibility for financing transport infrastructure. In the past decade, 
however, serious doubts have been expressed on the efficiency of a strong public 
financial involvement in infrastructure. 
The paper addresses the question whether infrastructure 
financing is a necessary competence of govemments. It appears that in the past 
century the private sector has had a much stronger position in providing financial 
resources for infrastructure involvement. Therefore, the necessity for government 
financing is a stake in the current debate. 
In the paper several arguments pro and contra public financing 
are systemically evaluated and illustrated by various uses related to various 
modes of transport. The conclusion is that there is much scope for the private 
sector in financing new transport infrastructure in Europe. 
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1. Introduction 
Transportation lies at the heart of the spatial-economic evol-
ution of our economics. The development of the transport sector -and spatial 
interaction in general- mirrors the socio-economic, spatial and political dynamics 
of our societies. In the sixties, a period with unprecedented economie growth in 
Western countries, transportation policy was strongly orientated toward network 
and capacity expansion. From the seventies however, the limits to growth 
discussion marked a more modest role of infrastructure policy in which a more 
efficiënt use of existing networks received more attention than a straightforward 
physical expansion. In the eighties new views have come to the fore, reflected 
inter alia in the environmentalist movement (green parties, e.g.) with its strong 
concern about the negative impacts of infrastructure on the general quality of 
life. From the nineties onward also strong interest in the potential of modern 
technologies (telecommunication, e.g.) for network improvement emerged, 
notably in the context of the missing networks discussion and of the evolving new 
network economies (see: Nijkamp and Blaas, 1993). 
These stages of transportation planning have also provoked 
shifts in scientific interest. Research in transportation planning has in the past 
decades devoted much attention to demand analysis, e.g. mode choice, route 
choice etc. Especially the behaviourial models in transport research dealt mainly 
with the demand side. The supply side has received far less attention, especially 
in a modelling context (cf. Rietveld and Boonstra, 1993). 
However, in recent years the profound changes in economie and 
spatial policy have brought about a re-orientation in transportation with a clear 
focus on supply-driven mechanisms, in which the role of the public sector is 
increasingly at stake. Many societies all over the world seem to move to a new 
type of planning framework and culture, in which sometimes planning as a 
normative activity is even questioned (cf. Nijkamp, 1993). The trend towards 
market principles and liberalist views sketched by Fukuyama (1992) and mir-
rored against others in devolution principles such as deregulation, decentraliz-
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ation and privatization leads to far reaching implications for public sector 
involvement in physical planning including infrastructure planning (see: Van 
Gent and Nijkarnp, 1991). 
This trend is reinforced by various force-fields such as public 
budget deficits in many countries, the need for more competiveness in (semi-
)public goods delivery in order to enhance efficiency, the need for more 
customized service supply at a local (decentralized) level, and the drastic re-
orientation in Eastern Europe where privatization is a sine qua non for bureau-
cratie inefficiencies, insufficiënt fiscal revenues and new equity and ownership 
considerations (cf. Kornai, 1992). 
In view of the sky-rocketing mobility at the demand side and the 
strategie role of transport infrastructure as a critical success factor for competi-
tive advantage and internalization at the supply side, transport policy deserves 
full scale attention. The positive exteraalities of transport networks run the risk 
to be overruled by negative externalities in the form of pollution, congestion and 
lack of safety. As a result, various types of government interventions (initiating, 
regulatory, financial or market-oriented) have emerged. However, the high costs 
of modern transport infrastructure in all modes have at the same time put a 
unbearable burden on the government budget, so that the debate has started on 
private financing of infrastructure, based e.g. on 'user charge' principles. Thus, in 
our era transportation planning requires a balanced implementation of actions 
which ensure a consideration of both private and social costs and benefits, and a 
network orientation which exceeds local or single-modal policy interests. 
The present paper pays attention to flaws in private financing of 
transport infrastructure. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an 
overview of problems and opportunities in private sector involvement, in general 
as well as in the transport sector. Section 3 offers a multi-modal historical sketch 
of the history of infrastructure financing in the Netherlands. Next, in section 4 a 
concise cross-comparative European overview of different financing schemes for 
the same transport modes is provided. In a final section some considerations and 
lessons regarding private financing in the private sector are offered. 
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2: Public Sector Involvement: An Overview 
In all market economies the role of the government is not 
absent, but is usually oriented towards various specifïc economie segments or the 
fulfilment of specific socio-economic objectives (cf. Fokkema and Nijkamp, 
1993). Traditional welfare theory argues that social welfare can be maximized 
through market transactions based on a free exchange of perfectly operating 
markets. In that case government intervention -leading to a shift in 'laisser faire' 
behaviour- would negatively affect the Pareto-optimal outcome of a fireely 
operating market. However, three conventional arguments are often used to 
justify government intervention under specific conditions: 
the 'infant industry' and 'infant region' argument, where in an 
initial stage of industrial or regional development the economie 
basis of the industry or region is too weak to be competitive and 
to survive. This argument is often used to justify subsidies and 
protection to the transportation sector in less favoured regions, 
e.g. in the European Community. 
the market imperfection argument which takes for granted that a 
market system does not always result in a Pareto-efficient alloca-
tion. In practice, there are many cases of inertia, biased behav-
iour or lack of information which lead to so-called market 
failures, so that a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources is not 
achieved. The aim of government intervention is then to remedy 
this sub-optimal allocation. Thus the role of the government is 
to attain the theoretically pure situation of perfect competition. 
Well known causes of market failures are: 
* imperfect competition: this may evolve in case of indivisibili-
ties or returns to scale (e.g., public Utilities), where public mon-
opolies may be necessary to serve the consumer's interest. 
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* imperfect Information: in case of lack of (reliable) information 
(or of equal access to information), governments may issue 
regulations on product quality or liability in order to protect the 
less informed actors. 
* absence of markets: examples are externalities (third-party 
effects outside the realm of market transactions, such as envi-
ronmental damage) or public goods (non-excluding goods such 
as national defense, street lights etc.) 
the ethics and justice argument which takes for granted the 
relevance of normative views on the functioning of the economy. 
This argument emerges if, in accordance with ethical or political 
belief of society or governments, outcomes of a market economy 
are regarded as inequitable or unacceptable. An example is a 
large socio-economic inequality to which the market system may 
lead, if not everybody has the same opportunities and talents to 
compete in a fair way. The govemment can then influence the 
distribution of incomes and wealth by, among other things, taxes, 
transfers, income policy (including a statutory regulation of 
minimum wage) or rent policy. An obvious case is discounted 
fares for children en elderly in public transport. 
In addition, the govemment can hold the view that in some 
cases the consumer underestimates structurally the importance 
of some goods and services (merit goods). That is why some-
times the consumption is made compulsory (for example, hel-
mets for motor cyclists) or goods are provided free of charge or 
at reduced price (for example, regional bus transport). It may 
also occur that the consumption of some goods should be 
decreased for everyone's own interest (demerit goods). This 
occurs, for instance, by imposing high taxes (for example, gaso-
line use) or by forbidding high consumption (for example, high 
travel speed). 
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Thus there is in the context of traditional welfare theory a wide 
range of motives for public interventions which would serve to achieve or restore 
a Pareto-efficient allocation. But at the same time it should be recognized that 
the good intentions of governments may have adverse effects. This is the case of 
so-called govemment failures. 
These failures might result from imperfect insight in the real 
demand for public services, insufficiënt recognition of (positive and negative) 
effects of policies (that occur in the long run), or because public policies lead to 
bureaucracy and complicated and non-transparent legislation. So the govemment 
should always value its own possible failures against the 'market failures' they try 
to prevent or correct. If the govemment decides that these arguments are, given 
their specific situation, sufficiënt to intervene, the question of how a govemment 
policy should be shaped and in particular financed comes up. This issue is also 
of critical importance for current transportation policies in market societies (see: 
Blaas et al., 1993). An important obstacle to effective infrastructure planning in a 
competitive network economy is the lack of sufficiënt funds for financing 
advanced new network infrastructure, partly caused by lack of public funds, 
partly caused by lack of willingness of the private sector to set aside the necess-
ary financial means. This might also lead to a delay in the construction of 
infrastructure. To reduce public deficits, the investment is then of ten spread out 
over a longer period of time than desirable. In the Netherlands the investments 
in the railway infrastructure, for instance, are planned until 2015. All those 
investments cover infrastructure improvements on routes already sufferrng from 
severe congestion and lack of capacity (in a qualitive or quantitative sense). 
The financing of public infrastmcture has traditionally been the 
responsibihty of governments, in their role as both initiator and main financier of 
infrastructure. This has helped to create the major infrastructure networks in 
Europe. It is noteworthy, however, that investments in infrastructure show a 
strong decline in the last decades in most countries, because of a number of 
reasons, one of the most important ones being the lack of funds, since most 
governments are developing policies to reduce public deficits. Another major 
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cause is the change of financial priorities, where investments in infrastructure 
have to compete increasingly with expenses for other policies (including interest 
payments on public debts). Since in many cases user charges for infrastructure 
are not seen as a viable option, investments in infrastructure stay at their 
current, historically low, levels in most countries. 
It should be recognized however, that the role of governments in 
financing transportation infrastructure -as an important public good- has not 
always been the same. For instance, in the nineteenth century a considerable 
part of major infrastructure projects (canals, railways, roads) were developed 
with the aid of private money. Only in our century it was realized that -mainly 
because of external and equity effects- infrastructure should be a major responsi-
bility of governments. This has lead to a huge budget claim on public resources 
for infrastructure provisions. In the past years however, the insight has grown 
that it should not a priori be self-evident that all types of infrastructure would 
have to be financed by governments, certainly not in a situation of high public 
deficits. However financing of infrastructure by private sources implies that more 
attention is focused on the economie-commercial value of infrastructure. 
When considering the history of private infrastructure financing 
it is interesting to notice, that private financing is also facing serious flaws. In the 
Netherlands, for instance, the first major investments in infrastructure -in the 
nineteenth century- where mostly undertaken by the King himself, since most 
private investments took place in the former colonies. This situation of lack of 
interest from the private sector has changed very little in recent years. The major 
cause for the behaviour of private financiers lies in the high risk-benefit ratio of 
this type of investment; the combination of high political risks and low or 
negative returns on investments in combination with a long pay back-period 
(mostly > 20 years) appears to discourage private investors (cf. Brealy and 
Myers, 1988; Copeland and Weston, 1988; Kharbanda and Stallworthy, 1983). 
Given the uncertainty and risks involved in massive infrastructure mvestments 
and given the complex network character of a transportation system, a strict 
division between public and private sector involvement cannot be made. This 
7 
point is clearly illustrated by Marcou (1993), who in an analysis of the role of 
public and private sectors in the Channel Tunnel venture came tot the con-
clusion that even a strict private fmancing by banks was surrounded and sup-
ported by a complex myriad of public regulations, interventions and public 
flanking policies (of a substantial financial size) which make even the possibility 
of a non-guarantee commitment for both the French and the UK government 
doubtful. 
In any case, there is sufficiënt reason for a further investigation 
of the role of the private and public sector in the building up of European 
infrastructure. Therefore, in the next two sections a concise multi-modal picture 
of financing Europe's transport network will be given. Section 3 will depict the 
Dutch situation, while section 4 will offer a compact cross-comparative European 
overview. 
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3. Financing of Infrastructure: A Multi-Modal Picture of the Netherlands 
In this section a short historical sketch of the ways various 
transport infrastructure modes in the Netherlands have been financed will be 
given (see also Rienstra, 1993). We will deal with waterways, railways and roads, 
respectively. 
3.1 Waterways 
Inland waterways have traditionally been one of the most 
important transport activities in the Netherlands. Not only the rivers, but also 
man-made canals formed an essential part of Dutch transport infrastructure. In 
particular, the norse drawn barges where important vehicles for both passengers 
and goods (see: De Vries, 1981). The construction of canals started already in 
the seventeenth century and continued until the beginning of this century. 
The canals were mainly financed by the cities, connected by 
these waterways. These cities created special societies aiming at commercial use 
of the canals. This decentralized system was mainly based on a toll system, so 
that at the end the user had to pay for it. Given the high profitability of many 
canals, various cities were very keen on expanding the inland waterways system. 
The exploitation of the canals was usually a joint responsibility of shippers' 
associations (guilds). Until the nineteenth century the central govemment did not 
participate substantially in these canals. In the nineteenth century however, the 
central govemment started to finance the canals, which were also much bigger 
than those built before. Especially King Willem I was pushing the construction of 
these canals, which were sometimes even partly financed by his own private 
capital. In the twentieth century the central govemment became the financier of 
new infrastructure, the toll-systems were gradually abolished, and most small 
canals were closed. 
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3.2 Railways 
Since 1830, the development of railways led to a new phase in 
the evolution of modern infrastructure in the Netherlands. 
In the first stage (until 1860) all railways were developed on a 
private-commercial basis. Initially, even financial compensations were given to 
horse-drawn barges and carriages in order to reduce resistance of competing 
interest parties. Concessions for private exploitation were granted by the 
government. 
In the second stage (1860-1890) the equity objective played a 
role. Various cities were not connected to the new railway infrastructure as such 
links were not commercially feasible. The development of the railways was also 
staying behind other European countries, where the construction of new railways 
was supported much more by the governments. Therefore, in this new stage the 
government took upon itself the responsibility to build expansions of the railway 
system for less profitable sections. The exploitation of these new links rested 
however still with private companies (sometimes subsidized by the government). 
The next stage (1890-1948) meant a gradual integration of the 
segmented Dutch railway system, in order to benefit from the network synergy. 
At the end one national railway company (the Dutch Railways) was created 
which had a monopoly position, but at the same time also had a duty for 
exploitating and transport on all designated links of the network. This social 
equity objective meant in practice that it became almost impossible to operate 
the railway system on a commercial basis. 
In the post-war stage the Dutch Railways participated also in 
regional bus transport. Gradually the company entered a stage of structural 
deficits which were covered by the government. Since 1985 the Dutch Railways 
have to operate with a fixed budget established annually a priori by the govern-
ment. New infrastructure is financed è fonds perdu by the government, mainten-
ance and depreciation are financed by the Dutch Railways. In recent years there 
is increasing pressure to have again a commercial exploitation of the railway 
system (including financing on the open capita! market). 
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3.3 Roads 
As mentioned above, horse drawn carriages and later on 
automobiles made up the main vehicles on road infrastructure. The strong 
competition between various types of transport led at the end to a winning 
position of the private car. The drastic expansion of road infrastructure 
parallelled this growth of private transport. 
Drastic investments in road infrastructure started essentially at 
the beginning of this century. The govemment took the responsibility to finance 
road infrastructure, the revenues were mainly collected from road taxes, vehicle 
taxes and general taxes. Private financing of roads has never become a major 
activity; only a few bridges and tunnels have been privately financed and 
exploited, although in recent years there is an increasing tendency to expand the 
number of privately financed infrastructural options. 
3.4 Concluding remarks 
The formidable growth in mobility in the post-war period (see: 
Nijkamp et al., 1991) has not only caused a massive expansion of transport 
infrastructure, but also a selective growth of some modes (with private road 
transport as the absolute winner). Public financing of traditional modes (water-
ways, railways) has hence been increased. The role of the govemment has been 
fluctuating between abstention, dominant involvements and encouragement of 
private initiatives. Apparently, the policy life cycle of infrastructure financing in 
the Netherlands is following the budget cycle. This means that the gradual 
decline of private infrastructural initiatives may soon turn into a greater impact 
of the private sector on financing and exploitation of various infrastmcture 
modes. 
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4. A Cross-Comparative European Overview 
In general, governments have a great impact on the development 
and financing of transport infrastmcture, both directly and indirectly. The modes 
of financing appear to differ among different infrastructure modes. This also 
makes private financing a complicated matter, and as a result to the identifica-
tion of an optimal structure of charges and of an optimal level of user charges is 
fraught with many difficulties. This does not only hold true for the Netherlands, 
but also for many other European countries, as will illustrated in this section on 
the basis of experiences from Denmark, France, Germany, Great-Britain, 
Sweden and Switzerland. In subsections 4.1 - 4.3 we will deal with inland 
waterways, railways and motorways respectively. 
4.1 Waterways 
Historically, the plans for the development of new major water-
ways such as the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal and the first Channel tunnel 
plans all resulted from private initiatives (see: Marcou, 1993), based on conces-
sion agreements with governments. 
In Europe, waterways have lost a considerable part of their 
historical importance. Only in the triangle the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Germany -and to a lesser extent France and Switzerland- does inland waterways 
transport still play an important role, mainly as a result of the strategie import-
ance of the river Rhine (see: Giaoutzi and Nijkamp, 1993). 
According to the Mannheim Treaty (1869) priority treatments of 
national fleets and levies of user charges are prohibited, so that private initiat-
ives for exploitation and maintenance do not seem possible. It is interesting 
however, how the division of freight over the various competing shippers runs via 
an auction system in order to cope with the problem of overcapacity. 
The recent opening of the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal might in 
principle offer a new strategie link to East- and South-East Europe, although the 
current situation in former Yugo-Slavia precludes a profitable use of this 
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potentially important segment. 
It turns out that almost all waterway infrastructure links have 
been -and are still- financed by governments. Despite the potential of waterways 
(cheap, huge capacity, environment-friendly, safe), this transport mode has a low 
priority in a European context, although in recent years organisations such as 
ECMT and EC have made a plea for revival of this mode of transport. 
4.2 Railways 
The development of the railway systems in Europe was in many 
countries the result of private initiatives and investments, at least in the begin-
ning. A well known example is the development of Greek Railways by French 
companies. Nevertheless there was an active involvement of governments by 
providing concessions, by approving the fare systems, by providing the land, by 
executing complementary civil works and soon also the financing of infrastruc-
ture and subsidizing the companies. As a result of both public interest in isolated 
areas and the worsening competitive position of railroads, the state in the 
European countries became more and more involved, both financially and 
organisationally. In most countries this has led to national railway companies. 
In Great-Britain, for instance, the railways were nationalized in 
1946. But in the past decades the formidable losses of British Rail have forced 
decision makers to reorganise the company. At present, BR is subdivided into six 
business units or sectors, with a high degree of autonomy. Four of these sectors 
concern passenger transport, Intercity Passenger (commercially operated), 
Network Southeast (state subsidized), Regional Services (state subsidized) and 
European Passenger Services (to be operated on a commercial basis). Next, the 
two freight transport units, Trainload Freight and Rail Freight Distribution have 
to be run on a commercial basis. This re-organisation has led to a drastic 
reduction in transfers for deficits from the central goverament (£1.217 min in 
1983 as against £607 min in 1989). 
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BR is also the owner of the infrastructure and has to maintain 
this according to market principles, so that also the above mentioned 6 business 
units have to pay for the use of these infrastructure services. So far BR is not 
free to borrow money on the open capital market, so that indirectly the govem-
ment is still financially controlling BR. 
The new Swedish railway infrastructure policy is interesting in 
that all costs (including external costs) have to be borne by the user, with a 
differentiation according fixed and variable costs, while favouring competition on 
certain links (see: Hansson and Nillson, 1991). For this purpose the Swedish 
Railways were subdivided in 1988 into two divisions, Statens Jarnvagar (SJ) (in 
charge of the exploitation) and Banverket (BV) (in charge of the management of 
the infrastructure). The intercity and commodity transport section of SJ has to 
operate on a commercial basis. Non-profitable segments can be supported by the 
government. The regional network belongs to the competence of regional 
governments. These authorities may grant concessions for regional transport to 
either SJ or third parties. SJ itself may borrow capital on the market. The users 
of infrastructure (e.g. SJ or third parties) have to pay a remuneration to BV, 
supplemented with a subsidy of the government. In consequence, the influence of 
the public sector is still significant. 
The Swiss railways are subdivided into the major company 
Schweizerische Bundesbahnen (SBB) and some 65 private links (which are less 
important, however). The accounting system of SBB is subdivided into 3 parts: a 
company account, an infrastructure account and an investment account. Depreci-
ation and interest from the investment account are sluiced to the company and 
infrastructure account, so that administratively exploitation and management of 
infrastructure can be separated. SBB makes a distinction into commercial 
transport (long distance passenger and mainly freight transport) and non-
commercial transport (mainly regional passenger transport). The Swiss govern-
ment is still owner of the infrastructure and finances construction and mainten-
ance. The commercial segments have to pay a user charge. 
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In Germany the Deutsche Bundesbahn (DB) has been granted 
the right to borrow money on the capital market (the loans are guaranteed by 
the government, however) in order to finance its own infrastructure. Partly as of 
exploitation losses DB has accumulated high debts, which at present have to be 
covered by the German government. 
The same situation applies in France to SNCF, which also has to 
be supported by the French government. 
Autonomous lending by railway companies on the capital market 
is not allowed in countries like Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzer-
land, while also BR is forced to use public loans. The advantage of private 
money involvement in the railway sector is the incentive to efficiency increase, 
but a disadvantage is the loss of control of governments on major investments 
for strategie infrastructure, while governments might still have to guarantee the 
pay-back of loans. 
The above mentioned distinction between commercial and non-
commercial sectors seems meaningful, as it allows a useful distinction between 
different parts of the transport market (passenger vs. freight, regional vs. long 
distance), so that investment decisions and flows of subsidies can made more 
transparent. 
The separation of exploitation and management of railway 
infrastructure is also an economically interesting idea, as then the financial flows 
between the governments and railway companies can be made much more 
visible. This is also important for the question of the level and structure of user 
charges. 
4.3 Roads 
The growth in car mobility is closely related with the develop-
ment of road infrastructure in Europe. In many countries the road infrastructure 
has been publicly financed (often via a system of road taxes, vehicle taxes and 
fuel taxes). In some countries however, private initiatives have been used to 
finance motorway expansion, e.g. in France and Italy. 
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In France the backwardness of the motorway network in the 
sixties stimulated the French govemment to use a system of private concessions 
offered for bid in order to collect private capital investment. As a result, the 
system of French autoroutes emerged, which are essentially toll roads (cf. 
Marcou, 1993). These roads are financed by the Sociétés d' Economie Mixtes 
(SEM) as a joint venture of the French government and private parties. In case 
of failure, part of the debt is guaranteed by the state. The tariff structure is 
proposed by the SEM, but has to be approved by the government, which also 
remains the legal owner of the autoroutes. 
Swedish road infrastructure policy takes for granted that road 
users should not only be charged for direct costs, but also for exteraal costs 
(environment, accidents etc). Such external costs were estimated to be 310% of 
the infrastructure costs (Hansson and Nilsson, 1991). Such a high charge has 
however, not yet been introduced. A state company, Vagverket ( W ) , owns the 
road infrastructure in Sweden; it is also responsible for road maintenance. New 
investments are evaluated by a cost-benefit analysis incorporating also external 
costs. 
There is a wide spectrum of financing mechanisms for road 
infrastructure in various European countries. For instance, in France, Germany 
and Switzerland fuel taxes are also used to finance infrastructure. In practice 
various different financing modes are proposed for new infrastructure links. For 
example, the new plans for the Great Belt link assume private financing with 
government guarantees, based on toll charges. The Channel Tunnel is based on 
private financing via the Eurotunnel company as a consortium of banks, while 
revenues will be (autonomously determined) fares, user contributions and 
complementary service delivery. The Mont Blanc tunnel is a multi-national toll 
road run by a French-Italian consortium including central, regional and local 
governments, insurance companies, banks and other private financiers, where the 
toll level is regulated by the governments. Finally, the Dartford bridge over the 
Thames is a private sector initiative govemed by a public sector concession, 
where the toll level is fixed by the government and where a ceiling has been 
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agreed upon for the maximum amount of private profit. 
It turns out that the wülingness of private financiers increases if the link has a 
(semi-) monopoly character (e.g., the Channel Tunnel, the Mont Blanc tunnel 
etc), so that the risks of competing infrastructure investments in the area are 
much lower. Furthermore, in many cases there is a strong public sector involve-
ment, in the form of either a guarantee for debts incurred by the private actors 
or an approval of the tariff structure and level. Furthermore, the ownership of 
much infrastructure rests in many cases still with public actors. 
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5. Lessons 
It is clear that infrastructure is a special network capital which 
cannot simply be provided by the private sector. Infrastructure has major 
strategie economie, social, fïnancial and environmental effects, which cannot 
solely be dealt with private initiatives. 
It is noteworthy that the interest of the private sector is different 
from that of the public sector, so that not only the fare system, but also the 
design and expansion of new infrastructure will differ for these two institutional 
regimes. In section 2 it bas been argued that the govemment may have different 
socio-economic grounds for a public involvement in infrastructure planning, 
construction, maintenance and operation. The experiences in section 3 and 4 
have shown however, that public versus private involvement in infrastructure is 
not a 0-1 case, but one with many variations which may be different per mode, 
country and budget cycle. 
It may be helpful to make a clear distinction between financing 
and exploitation in public-private sector involvement. This is indicated in table 1. 
Private 
exploitation 
Public 
financing 
Private Public 
I II 
III IV 
Table 1. Different focus of public-private sector involvement 
The first category (I) refers to a situation where infrastructure is 
regarded as a normal good with normal market prices. There is no public 
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intervention. The airline sector in the US is an example of this possibility. 
The second category (II) refers to many new situations concera-
ing railway companies. It has the advantage that the infrastructure will be 
efficiently managed, while the government has to pay only the fïxed infrastruc-
ture costs and not the fluctuating exploitation costs. 
The next category (III) concerns a situation where the private 
sector finances the infrastructure, but where the public sector is charged with the 
exploitation costs. This may be an appealing short-term budget solution, but is in 
the long run more expensive. 
Finally, category IV is a common situation in conventional road 
and waterway infrastructure. Financing and exploitation is under control of the 
government. 
In pnnciple, infrastructure might be offered and managed via 
the private sector, but then various conditions have to be met, such as incorpor-
ation of social costs of transport, due consideration to equity objectives (e.g., 
isolated regions or mobility-deprived people), a fully operating cost-covering 
price system in the transport sector with equal competitive opportumties for all 
modes etc. 
A major problem in infrastructure is its long gestation period, so 
that the risks for private financiers are fairly high and a fair return is not 
ensured. Such risks may include inter alia: political risks (public interventions, 
nationalisation), financial risks (interest fluctuations, inflation), construction risks 
(delays, rise in construction costs), operational risks (accidents) and commercial 
risks (false market expectations). This means in practice that the government has 
to provide in most cases financial guarantees for private financing (e.g., in the 
French autoroute or the Swedish railway system). 
The charge structure for the use of infrastructure is an issue 
fraught with many problems. In principle, it would make sense to employ a 
marginal cost principle, so that all external (social) costs including congestion, 
environmental decay and lack of safety are incorporated in the user contribution. 
In that case the potential user will only start a trip with a certain mode, if his 
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marginal benefits are higher than (or equal to) his marginal (social) costs. In 
practice however, this system is not easy to implement as knowledge on costs 
and benefits (private and social) is limited, the price sensitivity of infrastmcture 
users of certain modes is rather inert, and the indivisibility of transport infra-
stmcture may easily generate overcapacity which has to be fmanced in any case. 
As a consequence, a uniform and unambiguous system of private financing of 
infrastmcture cannot be developed. Private financing is a customized activity 
with still a fairly high public sector intervention. Nevertheless, various experi-
ences have convincingly demonstrated the validity of private sector initiatives in 
infrastmcture policy, such as the new Swedish railway system, the re-organisation 
of British Rail, or the operation of the French autoroutes. 
It is clear that government plans to shift high-risk infrastructure 
investment to the private sector will necessarily lead to the request for higher 
profit margins and shorter pay-back periods. Hence, risk assessment is critical for 
private sector involvement. Joint private-public risk sharing may then become an 
option; risk transfer and revenue transfer are essentially two sides of the same 
medal. 
In light of all above mentioned uncertainties for private sector 
involvement in infrastmcture investments, it is clear that a solid concession 
agreement has to be made between all partners involved which specifies all 
rights, duties, risks and guarantees during the time trajectory of the project. This 
also concerns complementary goods provision, such as associated civil works, 
industrial areas etc. An interesting option which is at present being discussed in 
the Netherlands is the so called revolving fund, where revenues from Dutch 
natural gas exploitation are used to finance infrastructure expansions with the 
aim to pay the costs back on the basis of a user charge, so that in the future 
infrastmcture charges will be fed back in this infrastmcture fund. 
A final issue is the liberalisation of the transport market in the 
EC, The strive for deregulation and competition will also have implications for 
financing European infrastmcture (cf. Henry, 1993). In the mean time it has also 
been recognized that several institutions which would have to operate on a 
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European network basis (e.g., railway companies, telecommunication companies) 
are fairly reluctant to give up part of their national competence. This leads in 
practice to extremely complicated financing schemes for transnational infrastruc-
ture, as is witnessed by the expansion of the French TGV from Paris, via 
Brussels to Amsterdam. This also explains the need for a European infrastruc-
ture fund which might be helpful in overcoming unnecessary national stumbling 
blocks. Because transnational infrastructure is meant for commercial attractive 
long distant traffic, such a fund might be (partly) financed by private financiers. 
It is in any case evident that a failure to develop an appropriate framework for 
private sector initiatives in European infrastructure will seriously erode the 
opportunities of the emerging European network economy. 
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